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摘  要 
在知识论研究中，与对信念及其确证进行了诸多研究并取得了丰富成果相比，
对认知运气的研究就显得很欠缺了。运气的话题虽然自柏拉图时就早已有之，但





































In contemporary epistemology, compared with the researches and theoretical 
achievements in the studies of belief and justification, epistemic luck, which is opposite 
to knowledge, does not gain much attention. Although the topic of luck has been 
existing since the time of Plato, there was no specialized study on the epistemic luck 
until the Gettier Problem was proposed in the 1960s, especially after the publication of 
Epistemic Luck in 2005. To a large extent, whether a post-Gettier epistemology is 
successful depends on whether it can successfully avoid the epistemic luck.  
In this thesis, firstly, I critically inspect the explanatory models on luck. Epistemic 
luck cannot be eliminated, but can be avoided. In the epistemology, the epistemic luck is 
becoming more important for its key role in knowledge attribution and response to the 
epistemic value. Secondly, from the perspectives of analytical epistemology, virtue 
epistemology and anti-luck epistemology, I investigate their failed attempts in 
eliminating epistemic luck. In this process, I argue that the essence of Gettier Problem is 
the epistemic luck, enrich Zagzebski’s view that epistemic luck cannot be eliminated in 
analytical epistemology and discuss the rational core of naturalized epistemology in the 
analytical epistemology. Therefore, epistemic normativity has become the intrinsic 
requirement of analytical epistemology. The rise and development of virtue 
epistemology provide opportunities for the turn of analytical epistemology and the 
virtue turn of modern epistemology is realized. But the virtue epistemology 
overemphasizes the condition of ability intuition and neglects the condition of anti-luck 
intuition. Safety principle on which the anti-luck epistemology relies faces many doubts 
when used to solve the veritic luck. And the reflective luck inevitably influences the 
human knowledge. Pritchard further improves the anti-luck epistemology and attempts 
to combine the anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology, but J. Adam Carter 
questions it. Thirdly, the skepticism and intuitively lucky knowledge doubt the 














to continue to solve the epistemic luck through the traditional ways will not work. 
Finally, I claim that the global reliabilism which defines knowledge through agent, 
process and evidence, can avoid the epistemic luck by arguing virtuous evidentialism 
and the integration of reliabilism and evidentialism. 
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它还与知识的价值问题、知识与行动、知识与权力、know-how 与 know-that 等问
题有着紧密地联系，并为这些话题的讨论提供了新的独特的视角，推动传统知识
论观点生发新的活力。其实，这一效果已经显现了，如知识论中的理解问题③、
                                                 
① Joshue Orozco. Epistemic Luck, Philosophy Compass, 2011, 6 (1): 17. 
② Daniel Statman. Moral luck, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993: 17. 
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